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A PROPOSED REMEDY FOR THE DILEMMA 
OF INNUMERABLE FUTURES: UKRAINE, 
RUSSIA, AND NATO MEMBERSHIP 
“Time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures.  
In one of them I am your enemy.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
n the years following the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has faced 
numerous political and social challenges as it strives toward self-
determination.2 Many of these hardships can be directly attributed to its 
tenuous relationship with an imposing geopolitical superpower in neigh-
boring Russia.3 Efforts to gain independence and foster relationships 
with Western states have been stymied by what some have called the 
“Russian Factor” in Ukrainian zeitgeist.4 What has resulted from nearly 
twenty years of a new Ukrainian regime is a pastiche of western ideals 
and Russian nationalism, a nation striving to achieve recognition as an 
independent force, but continually reverting to its status as a “younger 
brother” to Russia.5 In an assertive move toward independence, Ukraine 
was able to secure promises of territorial integrity and sovereignty when 
it obtained Russia’s signature on the landmark Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation, and Partnership in 1997 (the “Friendship Treaty”).6 Now, 
though, as Ukraine looks to take the next step in Westernizing its defense 
                                                                                                                         
 1. Jorge Luis Borges, The Garden of Forking Paths, MICH. ALUMNUS Q. R., Spring 
1958 (Donald A. Yates trans.), reprinted in LABYRINTHS 19, 28 (Donald A. Yates & 
James E. Irby eds., 1964). 
 2. See generally Anka Feldhusen, The “Russian Factor” in Ukrainian Foreign Poli-
cy, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Fall 1999, at 119; John Morrison, Pereyaslav and After: 
The Russian-Ukrainian Relationship, 69 INT’L AFF. 677, 682 (1993); Philip Chase, Note, 
Conflict in the Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic Conflict Under the Contemporary 
Model of Sovereignty, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 219 (1994) (discussing the problems 
caused by Crimea in Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union). 
 3. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 682 (“Ukraine’s stake in the outcome of this 
process of Russian self-definition is much higher than that of the other former Soviet 
republics.”). 
 4. See Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that Ukraine is in the process of 
turning its back on Russia by establishing a view toward Western policies as evidenced 
by four factors: the relationship with NATO; a stronger position with the Black Sea Fleet; 
implementation of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership; and economic 
policy). 
 5. Morrison, supra note 2, at 682. 
 6. Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation 
and Partnership, Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174. [hereinafter Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership]. 
I 
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mechanisms, many politicians and citizens from both States have raised 
debate over whether Ukraine’s signature on the North Atlantic Treaty 
would violate its obligations to Russia under the Friendship Treaty.7 
While many writers have focused on the political and social ramifica-
tions of NATO membership, this Note aims to explore the legal ramifica-
tions as recognized by international treaty law if Ukraine were to accept 
a bid to join the NATO military alliance.8 Fundamentally, for the treaties 
to conflict there must be an established violation of international law.9 
This statement begs the question whether an anticipatory breach10 of a 
treaty gives rise to a material breach, and to what extent this breach inva-
lidates an earlier treaty.11 Relying on the universally accepted treaty law 
maxim pacta sunt servanda,12 this Note concludes that Ukraine-NATO 
                                                                                                                         
 7. Friendship Between Russia and Ukraine Comes to an End, PRAVDA.RU, Jan. 1, 
2008, http://english.pravda.ru/world/ussr/23-01-2008/103596-russia_ukraine-0 (Dmitry 
Sudakov trans.); Oleg Shchedrov, Russia Warns Its Neighbors over NATO Ambitions, 
REUTERS, Jun. 6, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL0643117820080606; David 
L. Stern, Russian Actions Reignite Tensions over Strategic Port in Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2008, at A6; Aleksandr Vatutin, Dragging Ukraine into NATO Shall Undermine 
Friendship and Partnership Treaty with Russia, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA, June 17, 2008, 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2008/06/17/198741.html. 
 8. See Anatoliy M. Zlenko, Foreign Policy Interests of Ukraine and Problems of 
European Security, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45 (1997) (discussing the political develop-
ment and foreseeable political ramifications of Ukraine in Post-Soviet Europe, as well as 
Ukraine’s developments with NATO); see also Friendship Between Russia and Ukraine 
Comes to an End, supra note 7; Shchedrov, supra note 7; Stern, supra note 7; Vatutin, 
supra note 7. 
 9. GUYORA BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION: THE 
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY 28 (1988). Binder’s work on the Arab-Israeli conflict and his 
examination of the various treaty obligations between the United States, Egypt, and the 
Arab League is an inspiration for much of the reasoning and arguments in this Note. 
Binder, however, analyzes treaty obligations in light of a theory that a treaty confers an 
objective property right. Id. While this is an intriguing theory, it is not addressed in this 
Note; meanwhile, the basic tenants of Binder’s argument are indeed relevant to this dis-
cussion. 
 10. Id. at 160 n.175 (“By anticipatory breach, I mean the doctrine that the formation 
of a contract obligating one to violate an earlier contract under some future circumstance 
is a wrong, mandating imposition of whatever sanctions ordinarily attend breach.”). 
 11. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 38 (2001) (“Interna-
tional law clearly recognizes the right of a State to terminate a treaty if another party has 
breached its obligations under the agreement. Customary International law and VCLT 
[,however, does not allow for termination] unless another party has materially breached a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of a treaty.”) (empha-
sis in the original, internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 
331, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith.”); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
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membership would require a renegotiation of the terms of the Treaty of 
Friendship in order to avoid uncertainties that would arise inevitably in 
the event of a conflict between Russia and a NATO ally. 
Part I of this Note examines the basic theories of international law as 
purported by legal positivists and political realists. Part II outlines the 
fundamentals of international treaty interpretation. Part III provides 
background on the political and legal complications of the relationship 
between Russia and Ukraine. Part IV analyses the conflicting aspects of 
the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship, and juxtaposes 
the conflict with a prior, similar dispute between Egypt, Israel, and Syria 
in order to highlight the insufficiency of past efforts and identify remain-
ing shortfalls. Then, finally, Part V evaluates prospective methods for 
avoiding ambiguous treaty obligations in the future. Ultimately, this Note 
argues that transparent, preemptive renegotiation of ambiguous obliga-
tions is the best path to establishing bright-line alliances between 
Ukraine and Russia going forward. 
I. BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Treaty law is, for the most part, noncontroversial.13 By definition, a 
treaty is a written agreement between states, governed by international 
law, conferring upon states certain legal rights and obligations.14 Because 
treaties are governed by international law, their terms are subject to the 
hierarchy of international laws of interpretation rather than the municipal 
and domestic laws of their various member-states.15 Unlike domestic 
law, sources of international law are not as readily identifiable.16 No in-
ternational legislation or international court exists to issue binding legal 
rules; the international court, for example, is not bound by the principle 
                                                                                                                         
LAW 9 (3d ed. 1999) (“[P]acta sunt servanda . . . express[es] the fundamental principle 
that agreements, even between sovereign states, are to be respected.”). 
 13. REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (1986) 
 14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 2, sec. 1(a) (“‘trea-
ty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and go-
verned by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments . . . .”); JANIS, supra note 12, at 9; WALLACE, supra note 13, at 197. 
But see South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 402 (Dec. 21) (separate opi-
nion of Judge Jessup). (“The notion that there is a clear and ordinary meaning of the word 
treaty is a mirage.”). 
 15. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 12. 
 16. Keith G. Govern & Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: Inter-
national Law Misses Its Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 55, 66 (2008) (“The 
sources of international law are: (1) treaties, (2) customary international law, (3) jus co-
gens principles (“preemptory norms”) recognized by civilized nations, and (4) judicial 
decisions of the International Court of Justice.”). 
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of stare decisis.17 Therefore, the binding force of treaties is derived from 
an implied good faith obligation—pacta sunt servanda (agreements are 
to be respected).18 Treaty law, then, is largely self-regulating; to resolve 
construction and interpretation disputes, one must look to other treaties 
and customs of international practice.19 
It is crucial to note that treaties have a dual nature.20 Each is a creature 
of both political and legal intentions, borne out of a political process to 
serve as a component of the system of international law.21 While the le-
gal doctrine of treaty law may be relatively straightforward, myriad so-
cial and political factors can blur state obligations and make treaties 
more difficult to interpret than other types of agreements.22 In analyzing 
                                                                                                                         
 17. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 7 (“[O]n the international plane there is neither an 
international legislature which passes international legislation, nor is there an internation-
al court to which all members of the international community must compulsorily submit. 
Furthermore, the international legal system does not, unlike the majority of municipal 
legal systems, possess a written constitution.”); see JANIS, supra note 12, at 8 (“Unlike a 
domestic legal order, international law displays little procedural hierarchy. One or anoth-
er court, one or another agency, one or another diplomatic settlement very often has no 
accepted primacy over another.”). 
 18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 26; see MALGOSIA 
FITZMAURICE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 3 
(2005) (“In principle, treaty obligations comprise those international obligations that arise 
directly by operation of the general principle of law embodied in the well-known maxim 
pacta sunt servanda.”); JANIS, supra note 12, at 9; WALLACE, supra note 13, at 203 
(“States are charged with performing and fulfilling their treaty obligations which are 
binding in good faith—pacta sunt servanda is the maxim which expresses this basic ca-
non of treaty observance.”). 
 19. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 7–8 (noting that the pragmatic response to questions 
regarding the legal quality of international rules can be answered by looking at Article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and that to decide disputes which may 
come before it, the Court is to apply treaties, customs, and general principles of interna-
tional law before looking to judicial decisions and teachings); see also BINDER, supra 
note 9, at 1 (discussing the interesting paradox about the nature of international law, 
where sovereignty of nations is the source of its legitimacy but also its subject of con-
straint). 
20.Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 
1935, 2004 (2002) (noting that treaties have a dual nature “as instrumental and expressive 
tools”). 
 21. SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, THE POLITICAL INTERPRETATION OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
7 (2004); see also Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
777, 810 (2008) (“The nature of treaties as legal and political devices means that there are 
compelling justifications for providing deference to executive judgments as to how they 
operate and should be interpreted.”). 
 22. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 37. One commentator has elaborated on the conse-
quences of the political factors that complicate treaty interpretation: 
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the scope and application of a treaty, it is helpful to look at the intentions 
of the parties when they entered into the agreement.23 However, because 
treaties are borne of politics and law, it is difficult to separate legal from 
political obligations.24 Moreover, further difficulty may arise during this 
part of the analysis because constructions of legal and political obliga-
tions often overlap.25 
Thus, to understand a given state’s intentions with respect to a treaty, it 
is necessary to understand the two dominant schools of legal philosophy 
in international law.26 Throughout the twentieth century, the doctrine of 
legal positivism has developed significantly, 27 but notions of legal posi-
tivism in international law can be traced to the writings of Grotius, who 
said, “[A]ll things are uncertain the moment men depart from law.”28 The 
proliferation of international conventions, such as the United Nations, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the World Trade Organization, 
evince the extent of support for this sentiment in the international are-
na.29 Arguably, the driving force behind these organizations is the shared 
will to create a web of adherence—the desire for feasible enforcement, 
                                                                                                                         
Judicial actions that contravene executive foreign policy can harm national for-
eign policy and compromise the ability of the Executive to speak with one 
voice. At the same time, treaties create obligations that are designed to have the 
force of law with the implicit corresponding responsibility of the Judiciary to 
provide meaning to that law. Treaties are not unilateral actions by the Execu-
tive; rather, they acquire the force of law through legislative review and con-
sent. Unwarranted deference to executive treaty interpretations of instruments 
purporting to limit executive actions and that are interpreted inconsistently 
within the Executive Branch compromises separation-of-powers principles . . . . 
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 810–11. 
 23. See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 7. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 5 (“Assumptions that are internal to positivist legal analysis cannot be mea-
ningfully transferred to explain political phenomena. Words take on a particular meaning 
when used within the sub-system of international law.”). 
 26. See JANIS, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that the two types of international lawyers 
are positivists and naturalists). In this paper, naturalist and realist are understood to be 
interchangeable. 
 27. See generally JANIS, supra note 12, at 12; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal 
Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278 (2001). 
 28. MARTIN WRIGHT, FOUR SEMINAL THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY 39 (Ga-
brielle Wright & Brian Porter eds., 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
 29. See U.N. Charter preamble, para. 3 (“[T]o establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained . . . .”). See generally John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance with 
International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 881 (1999) (arguing that the 
basis of international law relies on compliance among states). 
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made possible by threats of legal or economic sanctions against noncom-
pliant state parties.30 
Doctrinally, the philosophy of legal positivism argues that “legal rules 
are valid only because they are enacted by an existing political authority 
or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are grounded 
in morality or in natural law.”31 Eschewing the notion of rules grounded 
in intangible concepts of morality, the theory relies on the belief that le-
gal norms are separable from other norms in society.32 This feature is an 
important facet of legal positivism that suggests certain norms exist be-
cause they are set in place by a legislature.33 From there it follows that 
these legal norms “play a distinctive role in the practical reasoning of 
citizens,” causing behavior to yield to legally proscribed boundaries.34 
While this might seem obvious, the theory begins to lose force in the in-
ternational arena.35 Unlike the sanctions imposed on a speeding motorist, 
the sanctions imposed on a treaty violator are not easy to predict, and this 
                                                                                                                         
 30. With regard to the WTO, see Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 527, 555–56 (2008) One theory behind WTO law suggest a basic assumption 
that “the principal purpose of WTO law is to protect expectations, that its subsidiary pur-
pose is to adjust to realities, and that these two purposes interact to promote interdepen-
dence.” Id.; see also, Daniel C. K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW 52–53 (2008) (“Under the WTO system, . . . dispute settlement bodies have 
no power to coerce nations to comply with its decisions. . . . The ultimate goal of the 
WTO is to induce the offending member to bring its measures into conformity with the 
WTO agreements.”). For the U.N., see sources cited supra note 29. 
 31. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (8th ed. 2004). 
 32. Leiter, supra note 27, at 286. 
 33. S.G. Sreejith, Public International law and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal Posi-
tivism and Neoliberalism, 9 SAN DIEGO INT’L. L.J. 5, 9–10 (2007) (providing an overview 
of the development of legal positivism. The running thread through all these theories is 
that law and morality are not connected, and legal validity is determined ultimately by 
reference to social facts). 
 34. Leiter, supra note 27, at 286. Leiter explains: 
[L]egal norms play a distinctive role in . . . [one’s] reasoning about what one 
ought to do. If I say, for example, “Don’t go faster than 65 m.p.h. on the high-
way,” that may give you reasons for acting depending, for instance, on whether 
you think I am a good driver, knowledgeable about the roads, sensitive to your 
schedule, and the like. But when the legislatures issues the same proscription—
“Don’t go faster than 65 m.p.h. on the highway”—that adds certain reasons for 
action that were not present when I articulated the same norm. 
Id. 
 35. Martin V. Totaro, Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and International Human 
Rights Law: The Case of Participatory Development, 48 VA. J. INT’L. L 719, 723 (2008) 
(“Legal positivism in international law takes on a peculiar form when compared with 
Austin and Hart’s respective formulations of what law is.”). 
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uncertainty is magnified when parties agree to ambiguous resolution 
provisions.36 In an international forum, the positivist doctrine is not sup-
ported by a hierarchy of legitimacy, but rather by a norm of agreeance 
that the law is to be respected.37 
In contrast to the positivist doctrine, legal realism adheres to the notion 
that parties will act in their best interests because legal rules are often 
indeterminate, and domestic law “is based, not on formal rules or prin-
ciples, but instead on judicial decisions that should derive from social 
interests and public policy.”38 The realist, for example, is in a better posi-
tion to explain when cases with similar facts have different outcomes.39 
With respect to case law, the realist does not go so far as to suggest that 
judges are making up law—rather they are free to employ “equally legi-
timate, but conflicting, canons of interpretation,” which can result in the 
indeterminacy of the contents of a rule.40 On an international scale, the 
legal realist theory often manifests as the political realist—or, realpoli-
tik—notion that international law lacks intrinsic power to prevent states 
from acting when politics suggests a contrary course.41 Former U.S. Sec-
retary of State Henry Kissinger advocated this school of political 
thought, arguing that a nation’s foreign policy should reflect its natural 
                                                                                                                         
 36. BINDER, supra note 9, at 21. Binder refers to, but rejects, a positivist argument 
that international law loses its legal character due to the absence of an international sove-
reign, and instead assumes that “international law can function as a legal system in the 
presence of conditions fulfilling criteria of legitimacy recognizable to such participants.” 
Id. 
 37. Id. at 21–22. 
 38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 915; see also Leiter, supra note 27, 
at 289. Leiter follows the “empirical rule skepticism” realist philosophy, as Hart illegiti-
mated the conceptual rule skeptic theory. 
 39. See Leiter, supra note 27, at 288–89. 
 40. Id. at 295. 
 41. Ruti Teitel, Humanity Law: A New Interpretive Lens on the International Sphere, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 667, 671 (2008). Teitel points out:  
[F]or realists, state power remains the fundamental category for explaining be-
havior in the international realm. The state continues to be the main actor in in-
ternational relations and, therefore, realists question the degree to which there 
may be significant substantive transformation in the relation international law 
bears to the state-citizen relationship (for example, changes relating to the judi-
cialization of the state) or any other citizen-collective relationship. 
Id.; see SCOTT, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that a realist would say, for instance, a treaty is 
a “mere scrap of paper”); see also BINDER, supra note 9, at 39 (noting, while not referring 
to political realism explicitly, that “[a]s a practical matter, nations have rarely accorded 
much authority to international law”). 
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interests rather than its moral or legal ideals, should they conflict.42 To 
the realist, what defines the scope of a treaty will raise political questions 
regarding state power and state interests, rather than international legal 
obligations.43 
While many of the basic tenets of the realist approach are heavily re-
futed,44 one of the important points an international lawyer can take away 
from it is the understanding that nations, when given the opportunity, 
will act in their best interest and not necessarily for the betterment of the 
international society.45 What the international legal system must strive 
for, then, is a clear set of obligations that promote compliance and strike 
against the notion that a nation will act solely in its best interest.46 There-
fore, it is important that countries eliminate conflicting obligations in 
order to avoid unforeseeable legal consequences when they are called 
forth to fulfill those obligations as required in the treaty framework.47 
Otherwise, when left free to employ conflicting means of interpretation, 
                                                                                                                         
 42. C.G. Schoenfeld, Book Review, 15 POL. PSYCHOL 579, 580 (1994) (reviewing 
WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY (1992)). 
 43. See Totaro, supra note 35, at 721. 
 44. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 9.  
  Myth #4: No one obeys international law. This is the ultimate, realist criti-
que of international law and relations. It depends on a utilitarian and rationalist 
attitude that States and other international actors conduct themselves only out 
of self-interest. . . . 
  This myth raises the most fundamental question in international law: what is 
the basis of obligation in international affairs, or, put even more simply, Why 
do States obey international law? . . . States and other international actors do, 
indeed, follow international law norms out of self-interest. But that self-interest 
is expressed as more than a situational observance of a particular rule at a par-
ticular time. Instead, nations have a self interest in promoting a systemic rule of 
law in international relations, a “culture” of law observance. . . . 
Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.  
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979). 
BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 9. 
 45. See Moore, supra note 29, at 884 (“[T]he greatest weakness of the contemporary 
international system is not the absence of authoritative norms, or underlying intellectual 
understanding about the need for such norms, but rather the all-too-frequent absence of 
compliance.”). 
 46. Id. at 884–85. 
 47. See Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 573 (2005). “The viability of international law, as a legal system, rests largely on 
the viability of treaties as a source of law.” Id. at 573. 
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a nation can justify acts that may run counter to the true purpose of a 
treaty. 
II. TREATY ANALYSIS 
When States enter into treaties and abide universal agreements, con-
flicts in obligations are inevitable.48 Having registered the Friendship 
Treaty with the United Nations,49 Russia and Ukraine normally would 
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) for treaty dispute resolutions.50 However, during negotiations for 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), the former 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made a reservation about submitting 
to the ICJ for such resolutions.51 It is therefore unclear whether post-
                                                                                                                         
 48. Id. 
 49. Russia and Ukraine registered the Friendship Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the 
U.N. Charter. 
 50. Fewer than five cases have ever been brought before the International Court of 
Justice to determine if a treaty has been breached. 
 51. Moore, supra note 29, at 915–16. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in-
cluded the following reservations and declaration in the instrument of accession to the 
VCLT:  
  The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by 
the provisions of article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and declares that, in order for any dispute among the Contracting Parties con-
cerning the application or the interpretation of articles 53 or 64 to be submitted 
to the International Court of Justice for a decision, or for any dispute concern-
ing the application or interpretation of any other articles in Part V of the Con-
vention to be submitted for consideration by the Conciliation Commission, the 
consent of all the parties to the dispute is required in each separate case, and the 
conciliators constituting the Conciliation Commission may only be persons ap-
pointed by the parties to the dispute by common consent.  
  The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will consider that it is not obligated 
by the provisions of article 20, paragraph 3 or of article 45 (b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, since they are contrary to established inter-
national practice. 
  . . . [I]t reserves the right to take any measures to safeguard its interests in 
the event of the non-observance by other States of the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Accession to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, USSR, Apr. 29, 1986, 1425 
U.N.T.S 441, 441–42. It is important to note that this reservation applies to the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, and therefore encompasses both Russia and Ukraine today. 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&c
hapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#EndDec (last visited April 8, 2010). 
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Soviet states would find themselves before the ICJ for treaty interpreta-
tion disputes.52 Regardless, this Note applies rules derived from ICJ deci-
sions in an effort to advance a scholarly approach to resolving this treaty 
dispute, as ICJ decisions generally reflect the international understanding 
of treaty interpretation.53 
In discussing treaty interpretation, the most appropriate place to begin 
is the VCLT, which is “quite literally, a treaty on treaties.”54 Treaty in-
terpretation should begin with the default rules set forth in the Conven-
tion.55 The VCLT’s conflict provisions are “applicable when supposedly 
conflicting treaties are successive and related to the same subject mat-
ter.”56 This gives the VCLT broad jurisdiction, as there are many subjects 
that a single treaty can affect—the term “subjects” can refer to the “sub-
ject matter of the relevant rules or the legal subjects bound by it.”57 The 
notion of conflict, then, is interpreted broadly due to the many factors 
and obligations that affect the scope and application of a treaty.58 There-
fore, the first step is to analyze the legal norms set forth in an agreement 
                                                                                                                         
 52. Moore, supra note 29, at 915. 
 53. FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 18, at xiv (“The recent jurisprudence of the ICJ 
has also contributed to the development and clarification on a number of aspects of the 
law of treaties.”). 
 54. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 26; ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY 
TERMINATION 159 (1975) (“Thus it is no surprise that the [International Law Commis-
sion], in drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, tried to judicialize treaty 
termination.”); FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 18, at xiii (“Even the functioning of 
treaties themselves is regulated to a significant extent by a treaty, the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.”); see JANIS, supra note 12, at 17 (“Since the Vienna Convention 
is largely, though not entirely, a codification of the existing customary international law 
of treaties, it constitutes a useful depository of international legal rules even for countries, 
like the United States, which are not yet parties to it.”). 
 55. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J 161, 237 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of 
Judge Higgins) (“It is commonplace that treaties are to be interpreted by reference to the 
rules enunciated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
Article is widely regarded as reflecting general international law.”). 
 56. See Borgen, supra note 47, at 603 (internal citations omitted). 
 57. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at 17 
(Apr. 13, 2006) (finialized by Martti Koskenniemi). 
 58. Borgen, supra note 47; see also Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 57, at 19 (“This 
report adopts a wide notion of conflict as a situation where two rules or principles suggest 
different ways of dealing with a problem.”); FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 18, at 4–5 
(“Treaties are one of the sources which give rise to international legal obligations. . . . 
‘[T]here is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is 
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or 
character.’”) (internal citations omitted); SEYED ALI SADAT-AKHAVI, METHODS OF 
RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN TREATIES 5–23 (2003). 
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as composed of subjects and predicates in order to illustrate what the rule 
is “about,” and what assertions are made regarding the scope.59 In defin-
ing the scope, one must determine whether or not the norm is mandatory 
or permissive.60 Mandatory norms impose an obligation, while permis-
sive norms provide for the freedom to do or to not do something.61 Once 
the scope of a norm has been properly delineated, obligations can be seen 
as either overlapping, completely identical, or disjointed.62 
Determining the subject matter of a treaty provision can include con-
siderations of sources outside the treaty.63 Providing guidance for analy-
sis, the VCLT’s treaty-conflict provision includes three theories for trea-
ty interpretation: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism.64 Article 
31 of the VCLT states: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose.65 
Initially, the VCLT prescribes a preference for textualism in the phrase 
“ordinary meaning given to the terms.”66 This directs the reader to begin 
by looking at the words of a provision as they are commonly understood, 
without taking outside sources into account.67 The words of the treaty 
                                                                                                                         
 59. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 14 (diagramming the complex scopes of 
various norms). For an example, see Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 57, at 17–18: 
A treaty on, say, maritime transport of chemicals, relates at least to the law of 
the sea, environmental law, trade law, and the law of maritime transport. The 
characterization has less to do with the “nature” of the instrument than the in-
terest from which it is described. 
  . . . But there are no such classification scheme. . . .  
  . . . The criterion of “same subject-matter” seems already fulfilled if two dif-
ferent rules or sets of rules are invoked in regard to the same matter, or if, in 
other words, as a result of interpretation, the relevant treaties seem to point to 
different directions in their application by a party. 
Id. 
 60. SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 5. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 17. 
 63. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 33–36. 
 64. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 204 (“The Vienna Convention adopts an integrated 
approach to interpretation, but nevertheless gives emphasis to the ordinary meaning ap-
proach.”); BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34 (noting that there are three “schools” or ap-
proaches to treaty interpretation codified into the VCLT). 
 65. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31, sec.1. 
 66. Id; BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34; WALLACE, supra note 13, at 204. 
 67. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34. 
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form the “foundation for the interpretive process,” and an interpreter 
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty.68 However, 
skillful lawyers can usually assign ambiguity to seemingly straightfor-
ward phrases when a state asserts a particular construction to gain advan-
tage in international relations.69 To assist with the strict reading of the 
text, subsections (2) and (3) of Article 31 list the specific documents an 
interpreter may take into account in order to deduce the “meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light if its ob-
ject and purpose.”70 The VCLT provides: 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made be-
tween all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty;  
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
[connection] with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by 
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provi-
sions;  
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its in-
terpretation;  
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the re-
lations between the parties.71 
Additionally, Article 31(4) stipulates that, where parties claim to have 
assigned a “special meaning” to a term, interpreters shall recognize that 
                                                                                                                         
 68. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, sec. D, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSO/AB/R, WT/11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
 69. James D. Fry, Legitimacy Push: Towards a Gramscian Approach to International 
Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 307, 330 (2008) (“Article 31 . . . leaves the 
door open for dominant states to push for political interpretations that best serve their 
own interests.”); BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34 (2001) (“If words always had fixed and 
determinable meaning for every circumstance, then one would have no need for interpre-
tation—nor for lawyers, for that matter.”). 
 70. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31; BEDERMAN, 
supra note 11, at 35. 
 71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31. 
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meaning if “it is established that the parties so intended.”72 Furthermore, 
while not explicitly stated, the reference to “object and purpose” has 
been understood as directing interpreters to employ a “teleological” ap-
proach.73 Teleological interpretation gives relevance to the fundamental 
reason or problem the treaty was supposed to address.74 Therefore, after 
establishing the ordinary meaning of a term, an interpreter should ex-
amine the above-referenced documents and consider the overall purpose 
of the agreement. 
If the interpreter has applied the Article 31 framework and the meaning 
of a term is “ambiguous or obscure” or leads to a result that is “manifest-
ly absurd or unreasonable,” additional documents may be considered to 
determine the intentions of the parties.75 Article 32 of the VCLT states 
that, in order to deduce the parties’ intentions, an interpreter may take 
into account “supplemental means of interpretation, including preparato-
ry work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.”76 The 
phrase “circumstances of conclusion” is generally understood to permit 
the examination of the “historical background against which the treaty 
was negotiated.”77 While some commentators have called into question 
the fairness of looking at negotiation history, the use of such documents 
has “become a constant feature of interpretive disputes over treaties.”78 
As a result, while sources that shed light on the parties’ intentions take a 
subordinated role to the plain text of the treaty, they are often brought 
into the interpretive process due to the ease with which a given term can 
be labeled ambiguous.79 
                                                                                                                         
 72. Id. at art. 31(4). 
 73. Fry, supra note 69, at 70. 
 74. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35. 
 75. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Cer-
tain Computer Equipment, ¶ 86, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R 
(June 5, 1998); JANIS, supra note 12, at 30–31; see WALLACE supra note 13, at 205 (“If 
giving the ordinary meaning to the terms of the treaty would lead to an ambiguous or 
obscure meaning, or would produce a manifestly absurd and unreasonable approach, 
supplementary means of interpretation may be invoked.”); BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 
35. 
 76. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35. 
 77. European Communities – Custom Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, 
supra note 75, at ¶ 86. 
 78. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35 
 79. EDWARD SLAVKO YAMBRUSIC, TREATY INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND REALITY 
171–72 (1987). On brining in other interpretive methods, Yambrusic has said: 
   The apparent preference for the primacy of text, moreover, reflects the 
predominant influence of the Continental approach over an Anglo-Sazon view . 
. . .  
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Ultimately, the aim of analysis is to find not just a conflict between ob-
ligations, but one that rises to the level of a material breach80 per Article 
60 of the VCLT: 
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles 
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or 
suspending its operation in whole or in part. 
. . . .  
3. A material breach of a treaty, for purposes of this article, consists in: 
. . . .  
(b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplish-
ment of the object or purpose of the treaty.81 
Because a treaty can have multiple purposes, it is well-settled that a 
breach must offend a main object or purpose of the agreement.82 Accor-
dingly, a minor breach of a major purpose is likely more significant than 
a major breach of a minor purpose.83 All in all, the Convention sets forth 
an understanding that there are instances where “a degree of such viola-
tion [justifies] termination or suspension, and that the touchstone of that 
degree is that the provision violated should be essential to the accom-
plishment of the treaty’s object and purpose.”84 
Once a material breach has been established, it is generally accepted 
that the other party may repudiate the treaty and unilaterally initiate a 
                                                                                                                         
   The International Law Commission, through what appears to be a delicate 
mixture of lex late and de lege feranda, had striven to give legal character to 
what in judicial experience denotes “historicity of subjectivity.” . . . According 
to Sir Humphrey, “the concept [of the ordinary meaning] must in his view al-
ways be related to the context . . . . 
Id. (alteration in the original, internal citations omitted). 
 80. Moore, supra note 28, at 885–936. Moore illustrates in a comprehensive review 
of the drafting history of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention and subsequent legal 
commentaries that, while it is uncertain what a trivial breach may give rise to, a material 
breach by either party in a bilateral treaty gives the nonbreaching party the right to termi-
nate the treaty in whole or in part. Id. 
 81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 60; FITZMAURICE 
& ELIAS, supra note 14, at 125–26 (noting that the determination of “object and purpose” 
of the treaty is the difficult issue in determining whether there has been a material breach 
for Article 60 requirements). 
 82. Moore, supra note 29, at 920–21. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Military and Parliamentary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 250 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda). 
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peaceable reprisal.85 Normally, “[Grounds] for invalidating, terminating, 
withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty . . . may be in-
voked only with respect to the whole treaty,”86 but some legal scholars 
believe that a state may initiate a peaceable reprisal in the event that a 
breaching party has materially breached an important portion of the trea-
ty.87 This notion, though, is much easier to apply with treaties that deal 
with commerce, and it is difficult to see how one could severally repu-
diate the Friendship Treaty.88 
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS 
In an effort to understand the intent behind treaties between Russia and 
Ukraine, it is critical to examine the history of agreement between these 
two nations.89 The Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654 marks a defining mo-
ment in Russia-Ukraine relations that shaped the subsequent three centu-
ries of foreign policy and law between the two States.90 While history has 
blurred the details of the agreement, it is understood that Ukraine sought 
protection from the Poles and turned to Russia for military assistance.91 
After signing the agreement, Ukraine expected to engage in a bilateral 
military alliance but found itself pledging a unilateral oath of loyalty to 
the Russian tsar.92 The years following the agreement were marked by 
Ukrainian hardship, famine, and oppression, resulting in a general skep-
ticism toward promises from Moscow.93 While the Pereyaslav Agree-
ment had many longstanding effects on Russian-Ukrainian relations, the 
most significant is the fear among Ukrainian citizens that “any deal with 
Russia is a potential trap, however favourable to Ukraine its terms might 
                                                                                                                         
 85. T. O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 114 (1974) (“It is generally agreed 
that the breach of a treaty obligation by one party entitles the other party to retaliate by 
means of peaceable reprisals.”); see also Moore, supra note 29, at 910. 
 86. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 44. 
 87. Moore, supra note 29, at 885–93. 
 88. Treaties that relate to commerce between nations generally have quantifiable 
subject matter: a ton of barley, or a cargo of wheat. In contrast, a treaty that defines hu-
man rights is not so severable. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 31. 
 89. Morrison, supra note 2, at 677–78. 
 90. Id. at 679. 
 91. Alexander Biryukov, The Doctrine of Dualism of Private Law in the Context of 
Recent Codifications of Civil Law: Ukrainian Perspectives, 8 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 53, 55 n.5 (2002); see also Press Release, Ukrainian World Congress, Pereyaslave 
Treaty—Statement on Observance of the Pereyaslav Treaty of January 1654 (July 3, 
2002), http://www.artukraine.com/old/historical/pertreaty.htm. 
 92. Biryukov, supra note 91, at 55 n.5; Morrison, supra note 2, at 682. 
 93. Morrison, supra note 2, at 679–80. 
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appear.”94 These sentiments continued to manifest throughout the twen-
tieth century under the oppressive rule of Joseph Stalin, reinforcing the 
Ukrainian inferiority complex with respect to Russia.95 
However, to regard Russia’s relationship with Ukraine as solely op-
pressive would be to disregard the notion held by many Russian leaders 
and philosophers that Ukraine is an integral part of the Russian dynas-
ty—a State coexisting with Russia, following the same worldly mission 
and preserving similar social ideologies.96 Kiev, for many Russians, was 
the “birthplace of the Russian nation . . . [where] Russians adopted 
Christianity.”97 The notion that Ukraine is a “younger brother” to Russia 
may be seen as a Russian understanding that the two States coexist, and 
the boundaries that have developed are purely artificial and evidence of a 
failure to understand that “Russia is a larger concept than the territory 
within the borders of the Russian Federation.”98 From this angle, one can 
begin to understand the motivation for Russia to enter into agreements 
where Ukraine garners sovereignty but not total independence; to some 
Russian nationalists, an “independent Ukraine” would be a contradiction 
of terms.99 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in an all too 
familiar setting. Meeting in the town of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky,100 
leaders from Russia and Ukraine set an example for surrounding territo-
ries by becoming two of the original parties to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (“CIS”).101 Ostensibly, the document recognized 
Ukrainian independence and renounced the Pereyaslav agreement, but 
the years following the signing were marked by Russian influence and 
                                                                                                                         
 94. Id. at 680. 
 95. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 679; Press Release Ukrainian World Congress, 
supra note 91. 
 96. John Edwin Mroz & Oleksandr Pavliuk, Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin, FOREIGN 
AFF., May/Jun 1996, at 52, 52 (“Much of the Russian political spectrum, obsessed with 
reclaiming great power status and reuniting the former Soviet republics, recognizes that 
Ukraine is the key to its plans and openly espouses reabsorption.”); see also Morrison, 
supra note 2, at 681. 
 97. Dmitri K. Simes, America and the Post-Soviet Republics, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 
1992, at 73, 82. 
 98. Id. at 682. 
 99. Id. at 681. 
 100. Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky is the town named after the aforementioned Pereyaslav 
Agreement and its Ukrainian cosigner, Hetman Khmelnytsky. 
 101. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, opened for 
signature Dec. 8, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 143 (1992). 
2010] UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND NATO 609 
reluctance to accept what was widely regarded as an unacceptable, pola-
rizing mandate by then Russian President Boris Yeltsin.102 
Largely due to the confusion expressed by Russian nationals toward 
the ramifications of the CIS, Ukraine spent subsequent years advocating 
a new, more explicit treaty for Russia to recognize borders and Ukrainian 
independence.103 Thus, in 1997, the two parties entered into the Friend-
ship Treaty.104 The Friendship Treaty outlines reciprocal obligations for 
explicit recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty and self-determination, but 
there are numerous factors that call into question the true sentiment be-
hind Russia’s assent.105 When the presidents of the two countries met in 
Kiev, they discussed a number of matters, but the primary Russian objec-
tive was to reach a deal on a lease for the naval port in Sevastopol, a 
Ukrainian municipality located on the Black Sea.106 Until these negotia-
tions, Russia had continually stalled talks about the Friendship Treaty, 
and only once the lease was agreed upon did both parties make any 
progress toward its execution.107 The importance of the lease is hig-
hlighted by its annexation to the Friendship Treaty when it was submit-
ted and registered with the UN.108 
As early as 1991, relations between NATO and Ukraine began to take 
shape as the country sought a new identity in a post-Soviet world.109 
However, at the 1997 signing of the Friendship treaty, it was unclear 
                                                                                                                         
 102. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 126–28 (noting that later agreements and Russian 
sentiment muddied the obligations of the Ukraine-Russia relationship in the subsequent 
years)Morrison, supra note 2, at 682, 684. 
 103. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 126–27 (“President Kuchma compared the signing of 
the treaty to cutting the umbilical cord between the two countries.”). 
 104. See Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6. 
 105. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 126–28. 
 106. Id. The delays in ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Part-
nership only gave way once Ukraine agreed to ratify the agreements of the Black Sea 
Fleet. Michael Specter, Setting Past Aside, Russia and Ukraine Sign Friendship Treaty, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at 1.13 (noting that the negotiations were postponed because 
of “tensions over the future of the Black Sea Fleet.”); The Secretary-General, Report of 
the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Law of the Sea, ¶ 371, deli-
vered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/52/487 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Law of 
the Sea] (“The conclusion of the Agreements resolved the problem of ownership of the 
former Soviet Black Sea Fleet . . . . These and other agreements made it possible for the 
Presidents of the two countries to sign a comprehensive Treaty on Friendship, Coopera-
tion and Partnership . . . .”). 
 107. Feldhusen, supra note 2, 126–28. 
 108. Law of the Sea, supra note 106, ¶ 371–72. 
 109. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO’s Relations with Ukraine, http:// 
www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/topic.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
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whether Ukraine would continue to pursue NATO membership.110 Ques-
tions about its intentions were answered when Ukraine formally signed 
the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in July of 1997, which estab-
lished the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Kiev.111 In the following 
years, Ukraine contributed military forces to NATO-led operations and 
continued to engage NATO on a yearly basis with updates and reports as 
it progressed toward satisfying the NATO requirements for member-
ship.112 In recent years, Ukraine has become the focus of U.S. efforts to 
increase NATO membership, and, as recently as September 2008, U.S. 
officials have visited Kiev to affirm that “Washington ha[s] a deep and 
abiding interest in Ukraine’s security.”113 
While this Note focuses largely on the legal issues raised by NATO 
membership, politics and law are often closely intermingled on the inter-
national stage,114 thus it is necessary to illustrate some of the political 
hurdles as well.115 In recent years, rifts within Ukraine’s government and 
general population make NATO membership seem unlikely in the near 
future.116  
                                                                                                                         
 110. See Specter, supra note 106 (quoting Volodimyr Horbulin, Ukraine’s top military 
official, as stating, “Ukraine is not going to join NATO now, and there are no conditions 
for that.”). Note, however, that in an accompanying declaration to the submission of the 
Friendship Treaty to the United Nations, it was stated that “the Presidents consider that 
the instruments on relations between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Trea-
ty Organization and between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization safe-
guard the national interests of their countries and contribute to the strengthening of secu-
rity and stability in European and Atlantic region.” Russian-Ukrainian Declaration, 
Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174. While this provision likely opens the 
door for Ukraine to engage NATO, years of new leadership in Russia have altered the 
sentiments toward NATO that former President Boris Yeltsin may have held in 1997. 
Regardless, this Note does not consider whether Ukraine is allowed to join NATO, but 
whether such a treaty would present obligations that conflict with Ukraine’s present obli-
gations to cooperate in a military effort with Russia. 
 111. GERALD B. SOLOMON, THE NATO ENLARGEMENT DEBATE, 1990–1997, BLESS-
INGS OF LIBERTY 120 (1998); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 109. 
 112. Grigoriy M. Perepelytsia, NATO and Ukraine: At the Crossroads, NATO REV. 
(2007), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art2.html. 
 113. See Judy Dempsey, U.S. Presses NATO on Georgia and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES. 
Nov. 25, 2008, at A8; Steven Lee Myers & Alan Cowell, Cheney Pledges Support for 
Ukraine, NY.TIMES.COM., Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com. 
 114. See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 1–25. 
 115. Id. (noting that focusing solely on the legal aspects of a treaty would mean neg-
lecting its broader application in the international political sphere). 
 116. Brian Knowlton & Judy Dempsey, Rice Defends Stance on 2 States’ NATO Push, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 27, 2008, at 3 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice as stating, “Georgia and Ukraine are not ready for [NATO] membership . . . . That is 
very clear.”). 
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In 2004, democratic elections were held in Ukraine and resulted in the 
installation of a pro-Moscow regime led by Viktor Yanukovich as Prime 
Minister.117 The legitimacy of the election was hotly contested, and the 
successful Orange Revolution in 2004 took Yanukovich out of power 
and replaced him with the pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko as President 
and Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister.118 Despite the rise of a pro-
Western government, however, the President and Prime Minister failed 
to cooperate in efforts toward NATO membership and engaged in in-
fighting that ulitmately stalled progress toward satisfying NATO re-
quirements.119 Then, with many commentators criticizing the Orange 
Revolution beneficiaries for poor leadership and ineffective governing, 
Yanukovich managed to reclaim power in the 2010 presidential election.120 
While Yanukovich’s return to power clearly signals a “pro-Moscow 
tilt,” his campaign focused on refashioning his image as the type of lead-
er who will not only advance the values of the Orange Revolution but 
also mend ties with the Kremlin.121 Furthermore, the recent election car-
ries with it a collateral, more important message that Ukraine has per-
sisted as a democracy, moving away from elections that have “hardly 
been free and fair.”122 
                                                                                                                         
 117. See Clifford J. Levy, Orange Revolution Parties Will Share Power in Ukraine, 
N.Y.TIMES.COM, Oct. 15, 2007, at A3. 
 118. Clifford J. Levy, Power Struggle in Ukraine Strains Governing Alliance, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4 2008, at A16. 
 119. For an indepth look at the Orange Revolution, see generally Natalie Prescott, 
Note, Orange Revolution in Red, White, and Blue: U.S. Impact on the 2004 Ukrainian 
Election, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 219 (2006) 
 120. Gideon Rachman, Oranges and Lemons in Ukraine, FIN. TIMES, at 11 (“Over the 
past six years, during the Yushchenko presidency, Ukraine has been democratic and pro-
western—but badly governed. The average Ukrainian now yearns for better government, 
which accounts for the backlash against the ineffective Mr. Yushchenko.”). 
 121. Mary Dejevsky, Ukraine is at Last Throwing off the Shackles of the Cold War, 
THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 9, 2010, at 32 (“But the many different roads of disillusionment 
with the Orange Revolution do not lead automatically back to Moscow. What has been 
the most striking, and most hopeful, about the 2010 election is the extent to which it has 
not been a contest between West and East, either globally, or within Ukraine.”). 
 122. Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutions, Elections, and Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
1595, 1604; see Clifford J. Levy, For Moscow, Victory with a Catch; Winner of Ukraine 
vote favors Russia, but Contest Didn’t Follow its Script, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 10, 
2010, at 2. According to Levy: 
[Yanukovich’s victory] may be a relief to Vladimir V. Putin, but the election 
was competitive and relatively fair, the kind of race that has not been held in 
Russia under Mr. Putin.  
While [Ms. Tymoshenko, defeated Prime Minister,] might indicate a rejection 
of the [Orange] [R]evolution, the fact that the country carried out a contentious 
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Similarly, Ukraine’s citizens have divided on the NATO issue.123 Re-
cent polls show that 52% of Ukrainians would vote against joining 
NATO, while only 22% would vote in favor of membership.124 Still, pro-
NATO government officials insist that the statistics are not a perfect pic-
ture of public sentiment, as much of Ukraine’s population is greatly unin-
formed as to what NATO membership entails (many think, for instance, 
that NATO membership would involve nuclear weapon deployment on 
Ukrainian territory), and harsh words from Moscow have swayed many 
citizens’ sentiments.125 Furthermore, residents of key Ukrainian territo-
ries, such as Crimea, have demographics with strong ties to Russia, and 
these allegiances have stymied NATO progress.126 While the recent pres-
idential election effectively ousted the Orange government, effective lea-
dership, democratic elections, and a core of pro-Western voters could set 
Ukraine on a more effective path towards E.U. and NATO membership.127 
IV. IDENTIFYING A CONFLICT 
In order for an official “conflict” to exist, the two treaties at issue must 
have a similar object or purpose.128 This VCLT rule is reflected in the 
nonconflict provision of the North Atlantic Treaty: 
Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in 
force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in con-
flict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into 
any international agreement in conflict with this Treaty.129 
                                                                                                                         
presidential election that was widely considered fair suggested that the Orange 
legacy had endured. 
Id.; see also Dejevskly, supra note 121 (“In this election there was no high-profile elec-
tioneering by Russia or by the United States. . . . Above all, though, this was an election 
between Ukrainians, not cold-war proxies, campaigning on Ukrainian issues.”). 
 123. Judy Dempsey, NATO Examines Ukraine’s Readiness to Join—Strong Opposition 
Seen from Russia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 16, 2008, at 3. 
 124. Id. (statistics from the Independent Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Kiev). 
 125. Dempsey, supra note 123. 
 126. For an account of the tensions existing between Ukraine and Crimea, see Chase, 
supra note 2. 
 127. Clifford J. Levy, For Kremlin, Ukraine Vote Cuts 2 Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2010, A1 (“[W]hile the public ousted the Orange government, . . . it did not want to do 
away with all aspects of the Orange democracy. [Other analysts] said a backlash would 
occur if Mr. Yanukovich tried to crack down.”); Luke Harding Kiev, International Ob-
servers Hail Ukraine Election as Fair, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 2010, at 20 (“Ukraine’s 
chances of joining the EU had been significantly enhanced, the observers noted.”). 
 128. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 30; see also 
Borgen, supra note 47, at 603. 
 129. North Atlantic Treaty art. 8, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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Meanwhile, this comparable clause is found in the Friendship Treaty: 
Each High Contracting Party shall refrain from participating in, or sup-
porting, any actions directed against the other High Contracting Party, 
and shall not conclude any treaties with third countries against the oth-
er Party.130 
Here, there are two explicit scenarios for a conflict. For Ukraine, be-
coming a party to the North Atlantic Treaty may constitute “conclud[ing] 
a treaty with third countries” against Russia. This will depend largely on 
the scope of the phrase “against the other Party” and whether the mere 
potential for a breach, absent an overt act, would justify repudiation. The 
second issue is whether the Friendship treaty could constitute an interna-
tional agreement in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty. The Friend-
ship treaty describes Ukraine and Russia as neighborly allies maintaining 
a cooperative front to ward off hostile measures against either state; a 
role that could be compromised if Ukraine joins a military alliance to 
which Russia is not a signatory.131 Therefore, in order to determine if 
there is a conflict, it becomes necessary to use the VCLT rules of treaty 
interpretation.132 
A treaty conflict can occur “when a state concludes a treaty that creates 
international obligations the performance of which would be inconsistent 
with the performance of an international obligation to a third state under 
a previously concluded treaty.”133 When looking for a conditional breach 
that can occur in the future, the analysis of a potential conflict aims to 
identify the presence of an anticipatory breach.134 On a domestic level, 
jurisdictions such as the United States have defined procedures for ad-
dressing an anticipatory breach.135 However, on the international level, 
                                                                                                                         
 130. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 6 (emphasis 
added). 
 131. See id. 
 132. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 133. BINDER, supra note 9, at 7. 
 134. Borgen, supra note 47, at 627–28. Borgen states: 
  Much attention has focused on whether the law on treaties encompasses a 
norm of anticipatory breach . . . . Current analysis does not address the problem 
of treaty conflicts in these terms; as such it is not a developed norm. Based on 
analogies from the domestic cases of contractual conflicts, however, the idea of 
anticipatory repudiation is a useful one, as it focuses attention on the underly-
ing goals of each treaty. This, in turn, urges a more systematic inquiry into the 
interrelationship of treaties. 
Id. 
 135. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 716. For the definition of anticipatory breach in the 
international context, see BINDER, supra note 9. 
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the issue of whether an anticipatory breach would nullify a treaty has yet 
to be addressed, and there has been little speculation as to the conse-
quences for two treaties that may breach in the future.136 
In 1979, two parties were required to resolve a similar issue at the 
Camp David negotiations over the Arab-Israeli conflict.137 In that in-
stance, Egypt and Israel began the implementation of a plan that con-
cluded with a treaty of peace, whereby Egypt agreed that Israel would 
“live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.”138 In 1952, 
though, Egypt sought leadership among Arab nations by “giving voice to 
a Pan-Arab nationalist movement, at times even proposing to merge with 
other Arab states.”139 Egypt’s commitment to the mission of the Pan-
Arab world had its foundation in a treaty between Egypt and the Arab 
League that required Egypt to maintain collective security with Arab 
governments and advance national aspirations of the Palestinian 
people.140 Consequently, at the time Egypt and Israel submitted their 
treaty to the United Nations for ratification, Egypt was “considered to be 
under a continuing obligation to join in hostilities against Israel” but also 
committed to not use force against Israel.141 
The issue was hotly negotiated among Egypt and Israel, and they even-
tually submitted a side-letter with the agreement clarifying that each 
would “exclude the use of force by either party against the other unless 
the latter were deemed the aggressor in a conflict with third parties.”142 
Yet, minutes to the negotiations reveal that the treaty was not intended to 
abrogate defense obligations already in place for either party.143 Most 
                                                                                                                         
 136. BINDER, supra note 9, at 3; see Borgen, supra note 47, at 627–28. 
 137. BINDER, supra note 9, at 3. 
 138. Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Mar. 
26, 1979, 18 I.L.M.; Agreement on the Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed 
at Camp David preamble, Egypt-Isr., Sept. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1463, 1467; BINDER, su-
pra note 9, at 3. 
 139. BINDER, supra note 9, at 10 (“Of great symbolic importance in this enterprise was 
Egypt’s central role in expressing Arab hostility to Israel, in consequence of which it had 
bore the brunt of every Arab hostility to Israel.”). 
 140. Id. at 3. 
 141. Id. at 11. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Louis René Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes: Allied and Israeli Rights 
Under International Law, 16 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41, 62 n.70 (1992). Beres 
notes: 
A Minute to Article VI, paragraph 5 of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty pro-
vides that it is agreed by the parties that there is no assertion that the Peace 
Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or that other treaties or agree-
ments prevail over the Peace Treaty. . . . This means that the treaty with Israel 
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notably, this would include cooperative military agreements between 
Syria and Egypt.144 So, while the side letter ostensibly set forth a stan-
dard for determining sides, the letter hardly corrected the problem since 
“aggression, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.”145 The problem of 
determining aggression becomes more difficult when one reflects upon 
the myriad border disputes and entitlements in the Israeli-Arab world.146 
Despite these problems, the treaty is considered a success in terms of 
Israeli-Egyptian relations, and still remains in effect today.147 The treaty 
failed in other respects, however, as the members of the Arab League 
responded with a unanimous vote to suspend Egypt from the Arab 
                                                                                                                         
does not prevail over the defense treaties that Egypt has concluded with Syria. 
Should Egypt determine that Israel has undertaken aggression against Syria it 
could enter into belligerency against Israel on behalf of Damascus. 
Id. 
 144. BINDER, supra note 9, at 11. For a description of the Syria-Israel conflict, see 
discussion infra Part IV. 
 145. BINDER, supra note 9, at 13; Louis René Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: 
Israel’s Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 111, 125 n.42 (1993). Beres explains:  
  Although it is generally believed that the peace treaty in force with Egypt 
constrains that state from joining with other Arab forces against Israel, this be-
lief causes problems. The Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty provides that the parties 
do not assert that the Peace Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or 
that other treaties or agreements prevail over the Peace Treaty. This means that 
the treaty with Israel does not prevail over the defense treaties that Egypt has 
concluded with Syria, and that Cairo—should it determine that Israel has un-
dertaken aggression against Syria—could enter into belligerency against Israel 
on behalf of Damascus. Indeed, even if Syria were to commence hostilities 
against Israel to recover the Golan Heights, Egypt might abrogate its agreement 
with Israel and offer military assistance to Syria. Shortly after the signing of the 
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, then Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil stated that 
he would regard any attempt by Syria to recover the Golan-Heights as a defen-
sive war, one that would bring into play the Egyptian-Syrian defense treaty de-
spite the existence of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty. 
Beres, supra, at 125 n.42. 
 146. See George Anastaplo, On Freedom: Explorations, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
465, 612 (“[I]t is probably not difficult in the Middle East to invoke longstanding border 
disputes in the course of the bargaining that any controversy promotes.”). 
 147. Bernard Gwertzman, 1979: A Glimmer of Peace, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Dec. 13, 
2004, at 22 (“Remarkably, though, despite continuing tensions in the region, the treaty 
between Egypt and Israel has held . . . .”). 
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League, having viewed the treaty as a violation of the Arab League’s 
commitments in the Middle East.148 
Therefore, the conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty and the 
Friendship treaty remains an exposed doctrinal problem of treaty conflict 
left largely unaddressed after the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty because of 
Egypt’s removal from the Arab League and a stated reservation about the 
Egypt-Syrian treaty.149 The potential for conflict is high among the post-
Soviet states for reasons that mirror the problems in the Middle East—
most notably, the dispute over the entitlement of certain lands and bor-
ders.150 Recently, these problems garnered national media attention when 
Russia and Georgia engaged in military action over the South Ossetia 
territory.151 Like Georgia’s dispute over South Ossetia, Ukraine’s te-
nuous relationship with Crimea is troubling given the latter’s dense Rus-
sian population and strategic location on the Black Sea.152 
                                                                                                                         
 148. Borgen, supra note 47, at 627–28 (“Current analysis does not address the problem 
of treaty conflicts [in terms of anticipatory breach]; as such it is not a developed norm.”); 
see also BINDER, supra note 9, at 15. 
 149. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 15. 
 150. Zlenko, supra note 8, at 45–46. Zlenko explains:  
Radical social and political movements in Central and Eastern Europe during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s . . . , the emergence on the political landscape of 
several independent states each striving to obtain its own model of social de-
velopment, and the collapse of the Soviet Union have all drastically altered the 
geopolitical balance in Europe. . . .  
  The dramatic events taking place in Europe have raised a number of new is-
sues, the most significant of which are the need to maintain further political 
balance in the region and the need to ensure the security of the newly indepen-
dent countries by creating an effective security system throughout the entire 
Euro-Atlantic region. 
Id. at 45. 
 151. Ellen Barry & Alan Cowell, Ossetia Leader Unclear on Goal for Russia Ties, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 12. 2008, at 8; Judy Dempsey, NATO Envoys Will Offer Their 
Support in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A12. 
 152. Crimea is a hot bed for entitlement problems. For more information on Crimea, 
see Chase, supra note 2. There are significant differences, though, between South Ossetia 
and Crimea. Most significantly, South Ossetia is internationally regarded as a sovereign 
territory, while Crimea is an autonomous, parliamentary republic of Ukraine. It is not 
under formal dispute that Crimea is subject to Ukrainian authority.  However, similiari-
ties exists due to the terroritory’s proximity to Russia and questions of legitimacy. Some 
Russian nationalists question whether Crimea was legitimately transferred to Ukriane in 
1954. Furthermore, the existence of a large Russian population and the presence of the 
Port Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet, make Crimea a volitle territory. For more 
on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, see the International Committee for Crimea, Trans-
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The Friendship Treaty imposes on Ukraine a duty to perform according 
to the principle pacta sunt servanda, which dictates that treaties must be 
performed in good faith.153 This principle bars parties from concluding 
agreements that undermine the value of existing treaties on the same sub-
ject.154 To avoid breaching good faith, Parties entering a new treaty must 
avoid obligations that frustrate or destroy their other treaty-made obliga-
tions.155 Therefore, to conclude a treaty that entails obligations that 
would forseeably frustrate the rights of a third party156 may ultimately be 
a type of anticipatory breach and, thus, a breach of good faith.157 
It is necessary, then, to analyze whether the North Atlantic Treaty 
would frustrate the object and purpose of the Friendship Treaty, and, if 
so, whether such frustration amounts to a material breach of the Friend-
ship Treaty. The scope of the Friendship Treaty’s obligations can be de-
fined by utilizing the interpretative framework established by the 
VCLT.158 The text of the Friendship Treaty states in part: 
If a situation arises which, in the opinion of one of the High Contract-
ing Parties, poses a threat to peace, violates the peace or affects the in-
terests of its national security, sovereignty or territorial integrity, it may 
propose to the other High Contracting Party that consultations on the 
subject be held without delay. The States shall exchange relevant in-
formation and, if necessary, carry out coordinated or joint measures 
with a view to overcoming the situation.159 
This clause creates an obligatory norm.160 The right to cooperate must 
be asserted, as it does not arise automatically when either state has a 
                                                                                                                         
fer of the Crimea to the Ukraine (2005), http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/ 
crimeatransfer.html, and see also Chase, supra note 2. 
 153. See Janis, supra note 12, at 27. “Every treaty in force is binding upon all the par-
ties to it and must be performed in good faith. The notion of good faith and observance of 
international agreements is, of course, a fundamental principle of international law.” 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 26. 
 154. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 28 (“Any act which destroys the value of a treaty 
right is a breach of the obligation to perform a treaty in good faith.”). 
 155. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 550 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1961). In dis-
cussing the good faith requirement, Lord McNair notes, “In short, the making of regula-
tions by one party which in substance destroyed or frustrated the right of the other party 
would be a breach of good faith and of the treaty.” Id. 
 156. “Third party,” here, refers to a third party with whom one has already contracted. 
 157. BINDER, supra note 9, at 28. 
 158. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 159. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 7. 
 160. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 8 (describing situations in which a norm 
requires an act, while another norm permits a contrary act—two acts that cannot be per-
formed at the same time, but can both be avoided). 
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claim for a threat to its territorial integrity, but when that right is as-
serted, the other party “shall” meet and exchange information.161 Analyz-
ing the treaty as a whole, though, the clause does not just create an obli-
gation to discuss mutual defense possibilities in the time of an attack—
rather, it suggests a procedure for the overall intent and purpose of the 
treaty, stated in the preamble: 
Considering that the strengthening of friendly relations, good-
neighborliness and mutually advantageous cooperation is in keeping 
with the basic interests of their peoples and serves the cause of peace 
and international security . . . .  
Desiring to improve the quality of these relations and strengthen 
their legal basis . . . .162 
The second and third schools of interpretation—intentionalism and 
purposevisim—can help in determining the “value” of the treaty when 
the text is ambiguous or unclear.163 Due to the broad language used in the 
Friendship treaty, supplemental information is helpful to define its object 
and purpose.164 Interpreting a treaty in a way that acknowledges the fun-
damental problem the drafters sought to address clarifies the object and 
purpose of the treaty.165 For Ukraine, the Friendship Treaty was intended 
as a declaration of independence and sovereignty—a major step toward 
achieving self-determination and official recognition by Russia.166 For 
Russia, it seems that the drive behind the Friendship Treaty was twofold; 
while Russia surely wanted to maintain its diplomatic relationship with 
Ukraine, it also worried about solidifying its position at the strategic na-
val base in Sevastopol (a Ukrainian municipality located in the Black 
Sea).167 The Sevastopol naval base is attractive because its location al-
lows for quick deployment to all the surrounding territories, and, up until 
the signing of the Friendship Treaty, its status as a Russian-friendly port 
                                                                                                                         
 161. Id. 
 162. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6. 
 163. Moore, supra note 28, at 919. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur to the 
International Law Commission, proposed that a fundamental breach “goes to the root or 
foundation of the treaty relationship between the parties and call[s] in question the con-
tinued value or possibility of that relationship in the particular field covered by the trea-
ty.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 165. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
supra note 12, art. 60. 
 166. Specter, supra note 106. 
 167. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 127. 
2010] UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND NATO 619 
was unclear.168 Therefore, the object and purpose of the treaty was to 
increase stability and cooperation in the Eastern European region by fos-
tering diplomatic relations between the two states and fortifying the 
Black Sea Fleet. 
Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty seeks to maintain security and 
peace throughout Europe and the Atlantic region, and, if necessary, to 
guarantee a framework of concerted military action when any of the 
members suffers an armed attack.169 In part, it states: 
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . 
[is] an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such 
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of an in-
dividual or collective self-defense . . . , will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking . . . in concert with the other Parties, such action 
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.170 
It seems clear that the object and purpose of these two treaties conflict; 
both call for cooperative military action or cooperative efforts to defend 
territorial integrity of their parties.171 In context, when one requires an 
act, the other necessarily requires a contrary act.172 These conflicting ob-
ligations “cannot be performed at the same time,” however, “both can be 
avoided.”173 Potentially, performance of its obligations under the Friend-
ship Treaty could prohibit Ukraine from performing its obligations under 
the North Atlantic Treaty; but there are numerous scenarios in which 
                                                                                                                         
 168. Id at 126; Andrew E. Kramer, NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at A16. 
 169. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 129, preamble; LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, THE 
UNITED STATES AND NATO, THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1–10 (1984) (stating that the purpose 
of NATO was to increase American influence in Europe in order to maintain peace and 
stability amidst the threat of communism after World War II). 
 170. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 129, art. 5. 
 171. Borgen, supra note 47, at 580. In regard to treaties that are concerned with the 
same subject matter for instance: 
NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) cover much 
of the same subject-matter, although GATT covers many other subject as well. 
Similarly, one can see that the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights essentially cover 
the same subject-matter as well. While a case could be made either way, the 
stronger argument is that these treaties would meet any reasonable test for 
“same subject matter.” 
Id. 
 172. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 8. 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
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conflict is avoidable.174 Still, the guidance set forth by the “Successive 
Treaties” conflict resolution principles in the VCLT does not provide an 
adequate solution for these types of conflicts.175 To follow the VCLT 
strictly, Ukraine would be required to abide the earlier treaty in the event 
of a conflict, yet commentators have noted that in reality there is no way 
of determining or preventing the fulfillment of one obligation over the 
other.176 We are confronted, then, with the same problems anticipated by 
political realism. Without a clear framework of obligations, the state will 
be free to employ realist foreign policy and make choices based on self-
interest instead of international legal compliance.177 
V. THE PROPOSED REMEDY 
With unsatisfactory procedures in place, it is important for Ukraine and 
Russia to settle on other means for resolving a foreseeable dispute.178 
Theoretically, there are three tactics Ukraine may employ in order to 
avoid liability for a breach. First, when the Friendship Treaty expires, 
Ukraine could terminate the agreement in accordance with its built-in 
termination clause: 
                                                                                                                         
 174. For example, cases where NATO allies and Russia are not involved in a military 
conflict. 
 175. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 30. In regard to the 
“Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter,” the VCLT merely 
provides that  
When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier 
one: 
  . . . 
  (b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of 
the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual 
rights and obligations.” 
Id; see also BINDER, supra note 9, at 3 (“A review of the practice of states and interna-
tional tribunals in instances of treaty conflict will reveal a pattern of avoiding the ques-
tion of conflicting treaties.”); SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 60 (noting that the con-
flict passages of the VCLT leave many questions unanswered); Borgen, supra note 47, at 
578. 
 176. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 64. 
 177. Borgen, supra note 47, at 589. The problem with the interpretation of pacta sunt 
servanda is that, in the event of conflicts where treaties of the same object and purpose 
conflict, the theory would “thus give the state the choice and risk of beaching either or 
both treaties depending on the obligations of the treaties and the state’s actions. This 
opens the door to state responsibility and places the burdens on the potentially breaching 
state or states to negotiate a solution.” Id. 
 178. Id. 
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This Treaty is concluded for a period of 10 years. It shall subse-
quently be extended automatically for further 10-year periods unless 
one of the High Contracting Parties notifies the other High Contracting 
Party in writing of its desire to terminate it at least six months before 
the expiry of the current 10-year period.179 
In doing so, Ukraine may avoid the legal complications presented by 
signing the North Atlantic Treaty, but Ukriaine would also be taking a 
damaging step backward in diplomatic relations with Russia, a nation 
with whom Ukraine has a long history and strong social ties.180 Addition-
ally, Ukraine has a large Russian population,181 and, amidst the present 
chaos within Ukraine’s government,182 it is unlikely that any political 
party would advocate such a strong showing of Russian dissent. Moreo-
ver, the object and purpose of the Friendship Treaty was for Russia to 
explicitly recognize Ukraine’s independence and borders; to renounce 
the document that ostensibly grants such recognition would be counterin-
tuitive for a nation still progressing toward complete sovereignty. There-
fore, while this might be an easy legal resolution, the political contingen-
cies make it grossly unattractive. 
The second way Ukraine may be able to avoid liability for a breach is 
by asserting an ergo omnes rights defense—Ukraine could claim that 
since every nation has an interest in self-preservation, and since joining a 
military alliance furthers this interest, doing so served a fundamentally 
justifiable priority.183 The notion of ergo omnes was elucidated by the 
ICJ in the case of Barcelona Traction: 
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign na-
tionals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them 
the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treat-
ment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither abso-
lute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be 
                                                                                                                         
 179. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 40. 
 180. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 119; Morrison, supra note 2, at 682. 
 181. Dempsey, supra note 123. 
 182. Steven Erlanger & Steven Lee Myers, Bush Adds Drama to NATO Summit, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 3, 2008, at 13. 
 183. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 23. Bederman explains: 
[T]here are some rules of custom that are so significant . . . that the internation-
al community will not suffer States to “contract” out of them by treaty. . . . 
[S]ome customary international law obligations are so significant that the inter-
national community will permit any State to claim for their violations . . . . 
These are erga omnes principles. 
Id. “Erga” and “ergo” are used interchangeably by commentators, but this Note uses “er-
go” for simplicity. 
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drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international 
community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the 
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the 
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, 
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes.184 
In short, ergo omnes obligations are those obligations for which “all 
States have a legal interest” in fulfillment, “by reason of the importance 
of their subject-matter for the international community.”185 The Barcelo-
na Traction case singled out slavery, genocide, and racial discrimination 
as violations ergo omnes—violations of preemptory norms that states 
have a duty to refrain from irrespective of any treaty, because the obliga-
tory duty of compliance is understood as being owed to the international 
community as a whole.186 Commentators, though, have found that the 
notion of the preemptory norm exceeds pure human rights obligations 
and also includes the right of a state to maintain international peace and 
cooperation.187 This includes the right to maintain peace and security on 
an international scale—a principle that arguably includes a nation’s abili-
ty to join a military alliance such as NATO.188 The VCLT reflects this 
                                                                                                                         
 184. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5, 1970). 
 185. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 55. 
 186. Alex Glasshauser, What We Must Never Forget When It is a Treaty We are Ex-
pounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1290 n.289 (2005). 
 187. J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 9, 73 
(1991). Van der Vyver explains: 
[Tunkin], on this basis, classified the peremptory norms of general international 
law under three fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter: The principle of 
peaceful coexistence; the principle of maintaining international peace, which 
includes the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force; and the 
general principle of international cooperation, which includes the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples and the principle of respect for 
human rights. 
Id. 
 188. Id. Van der Vyver goes on to note: 
Alexidze, took note of a wider range of U.N. practice and consequently in-
cluded in his classification of peremptory norms of general international law a 
broader scope of fundamental norms. Those norms entail, according to him: 
. . . .  
(b) principles defending the peace and security of nations (which in-
clude prohibition of the use and the threat of the use of force). 
Id. 
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sentiment in maintaining that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a 
preemptory norm of general international law,189 but the argument for 
ergo omnes obligations in the present case is attenuated and likely poses 
an affront to the prevailing international principle that treaties are to be 
respected.190 Moreover, the Friendship Treaty does not bar Ukraine from 
furthering its defense mechanisms; rather, the problem is the foreseeable 
confusion that would result if a NATO ally were to attack Russia. There-
fore, it is unlikely that a court would find that the Friendship Treaty vi-
olates a preemptory norm of international law.191 
Ukraine’s third option would be to enter into negotiations with Russia 
and submit a side letter to the United Nations amending and clarifying 
the obligations set forth in the current Friendship Treaty.192 This option 
seems best, as it would preserve the purposes of the Friendship Treaty on 
a political level and also help secure the legal obligations of both parties 
in the future.193 Furthermore, according to Article 37, this was the me-
thod of resolution agreed upon at the ratification of the Friendship Trea-
ty: 
                                                                                                                         
 189. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 53. 
 190. Recall that the principle pacta sunt servanda requires that treaties be performed in 
good faith, and in reality, nearly every obligation prohibits a state from exercising its 
sovereignty in one form or another. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 1 (“The modern interna-
tional legal system rests on a paradox—its legitimacy derives from the sovereignty of 
nations, yet its function is the constraint of such sovereignty.”). 
 191. Asserting a defense of a breach by relying on an ergo omnes obligation seems to 
require a more significant right. If there is a treaty obligation that bars a state from com-
plying with a universal norm of international law, this would be a better argument for 
ergo omnes violation. See Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles 
on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 844 (2002) (noting that the discussion of 
preemptory norms in modern international jurisprudence and arbitration is largely absent, 
and the main signifier of its presence lies in the VCLT). Here, though, there does not 
appear to be an explicit bar to Ukraine, but rather a foreseeable situation that would 
present dual, conflicting obligations. Meanwhile, according to Bodansky: 
[T]he commentary and most authors on the subject essentially contend that pe-
remptory rules exist because they are needed, i.e., to “prohibit what has come 
to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival of 
States and their peoples and the most basic human values.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 192. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 39 (“A treaty may 
be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in Part II apply to 
such an agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.”). 
 193. There will undoubtedly be difficulty in crafting an amendment that is both entic-
ing to the parties and sufficient for all foreseeable outcomes. Similar problems arose in 
the Camp David negotiations, where crafting language free of manipulative or difficult 
interpretation was nearly an impossible feat. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 13. 
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Disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the provi-
sions of this Treaty shall be settled through consultations and negotia-
tions between the High Contracting Parties.194 
While parties have a largely “uncontroversial”195 prerogative to nego-
tiate amendments to their agreements, the chief foreseeable problem is 
that severe complications will arise nevertheless if the parties fail to en-
gage in negotiations preemptively—that is, prior to a dispute actually 
arising. It would likely make more sense for Ukraine to outline reserva-
tions with NATO, eluding an obligation to cooperate in a military effort 
against Russia in the case of a NATO strike against a Russian territory. 
This reservation, though, should clearly express Ukraine’s unwillingness 
to participate in the military effort on either side, as Ukraine would have 
to abstain from joining efforts with Russia against a NATO ally. 
CONCLUSION 
“Uncertainty is a calculable cost that treaties operate to decrease.”196 
These words echo the positivist warnings first written by Grotius, that 
“all things become uncertain the moment men depart from law.”197 As it 
presently stands, the VCLT is wholly inadequate for dealing with the 
recent proliferation of treaties as a substantial source of international 
law.198 This Note calls on Russia and Ukraine to meet and discuss bright-
line conditions for triggering Ukraine’s military cooperative obligations 
in the event of an action by a NATO ally that threatens Russia’s territori-
al integrity. 
Ultimately, the international legal system needs to develop a frame-
work for dealing with anticipatory breaches of treaties. A foreign policy 
that promotes clarity and transparency with respect to obligations would 
further the positivist agenda toward enhancing compliance and respect 
for international law; this is a necessity a fortiori when military action is 
                                                                                                                         
 194. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 37. Issues 
regarding the Black Sea Fleet lease are already starting to arise. See Kramer, supra note 
168. 
 195. Michael Bowman, Towards a Unified Treaty Body for Monitoring Compliance 
with UN Human Rights Conventions? Legal Mechanisms for Treaty Reform, 7 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. (Special issue) 225, 235 (2007) (“[R]ules governing the revision of treaties are to 
be found in Part IV of the Vienna Convention (Articles 39–41), which are unlikely to be 
regarded as controversial.”). 
 196. BINDER, supra note 9, at 31. 
 197. See WRIGHT, supra note 28. 
 198. Borgen, supra note 47, at 578 (“[T]he VCLT’s treaty conflict provisions are nei-
ther an accurate description of current state practice, nor are they adequate prescriptions 
for how states should act.”). 
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the basis of a dispute.199 Over time, unforeseeable events can drastically 
alter the course of international relations. Bright-line obligations are ne-
cessary when one’s ally has the potential to become an enemy in the fu-
ture. 
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